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(Dated: October 15, 2018)
We consider the dynamics of Q–learning in two–player two–action games with a Boltzmann explo-
ration mechanism. For any non–zero exploration rate the dynamics is dissipative, which guarantees
that agent strategies converge to rest points that are generally different from the game’s Nash
Equlibria (NE). We provide a comprehensive characterization of the rest point structure for differ-
ent games, and examine the sensitivity of this structure with respect to the noise due to exploration.
Our results indicate that for a class of games with multiple NE the asymptotic behavior of learning
dynamics can undergo drastic changes at critical exploration rates. Furthermore, we demonstrate
that for certain games with a single NE, it is possible to have additional rest points (not corre-
sponding to any NE) that persist for a finite range of the exploration rates and disappear when the
exploration rates of both players tend to zero.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le,87.23.Cc,87.23.Ge,05.45.-a
I. INTRODUCTION
Reinforcement Learning (RL) [1] is a powerful frame-
work that allows an agent to behave near–optimally
through a trial and error exploration of the environment.
Although originally developed for single agent settings,
RL approaches have been extended to scenarios where
multiple agents learn concurrently by interacting with
each other. The main difficulty in multi–agent learning
is that, due to mutual adaptation of agents, the station-
arity condition of single–agent learning environment is
violated. Instead, each agent learns in a time–varying
environment induced by the learning dynamics of other
agents. Although in general multi–agent RL does not
have any formal convergence guarantees (except in cer-
tain settings), it is known to often work well in practice.
Recently, a number of authors have addressed the is-
sue of multi–agent learning from the perspective of dy-
namical systems [2–4]. For instance, it has been noted
that for stateless Q–learning with Boltzmann action se-
lection, the dynamics of agent strategies can be described
by (bi-matrix) replicator equations from population bi-
ology [5], with an additional term that accounts for the
exploration [6–8]. A similar approach for analyzing learn-
ing dynamics with ε-greedy exploration mechanism 1 was
developed in [9, 10].
Most existing approaches so far have focused on numer-
ical integration or simulation methods for understand-
ing dynamical behavior of learning systems. Recently,
[10] provided a full categorization of ε-greedy Q-learning
dynamics in two–player two–action games using analyt-
ical insights from hybrid dynamical systems. A simi-
lar classification for Boltzmann Q-learning, however, is
1 The ε-greedy Q-learning schema selects the action with highest
Q value with probability (1 − ǫ) + ǫ
n
and other actions with
probability of ǫ
n
, where n is the number of the actions.
lacking. On the other hand, a growing body of recent
neurophysiological studies indicate that Boltzmann-type
softmax action selection might be a plausible mechanism
for understanding decision making in primates. For in-
stance, experiments with monkeys playing a competitive
game indicate that their decision making is consistent
with softmax value-based reinforcement learning [11, 12].
It has also been observed that in certain observational
learning tasks humans seem to follow a softmax reinforce-
ment leaning scheme [13]. Thus, understanding softmax
learning dynamics and its possible spectrum of behaviors
is important both conceptually and for making concrete
prediction about different learning outcomes.
Here we use analytical techniques to provide a com-
plete characterization of Boltzmann Q–Learning in two–
player two–action games, in terms of their convergence
properties and rest point structure. In particular, it is
shown that for any finite (non–zero) exploration rate,
the learning dynamics necessarily converges to an inte-
rior rest point. This seems to be in contrast with pre-
vious observation [14], where we believe the authors
have confused slow convergence with limit cycles. Fur-
thermore, none of the studies so far have systematically
examined the impact of exploration, i.e., noise, on the
learning dynamics and its asymptotic behavior. On the
other hand, noise is believed to be an inherent aspect of
learning in humans and animals, either due to softmax
selection mechanisms [15], or random perturbations in
agent utilities [16]. Here we provide such an analysis,
and show that depending on the game, there can be one,
two, or three rest points, with a bifurcation between dif-
ferent rest–point structures as one varies the exploration
rate. In particular, there is a critical exploration rate
above which there remains only one rest point, which is
globally stable.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: We next
describe the connection between Boltzmann Q-learning
and replicator dynamics, and elaborate on the non–
conservative nature of dynamics for any finite exploration
2rate. In Section III we analyze the asymptotic behavior of
the learning dynamics as a function of exploration rates
for different game types. In Section IV we illustrate our
findings on several examples. We provide some conclud-
ing remarks in Section V.
II. DYNAMICS OF Q–LEARNING
Here we provide a brief review of Q-learning algorithm
and its connection with the replicator dynamics.
A. Single Agent Learning
In Reinforcement Learning (RL) [1] agents learn to be-
have near–optimally through repeated interactions with
the environment. At each step of interaction with the
environment, the agent chooses an action based on the
current state of the environment, and receives a scalar
reinforcement signal, or a reward, for that action. The
agent’s overall goal is to learn to act in a way that will
increase the long–term cumulative reward.
Among many different implementation of the above
adaptation mechanisms, here we consider the so called
Q–learning [17], where the agents’ strategies are param-
eterized through Q–functions that characterize relative
utility of a particular action. Those Q–functions are up-
dated during the course of the agent’s interaction with
the environments, so that actions that yield high rewards
are reinforced. To be more specific, assume that the agent
has a finite number of available actions, i = 1, 2, ..., n, and
let Qi(t) denote the Q-value of the corresponding action
at time t. Then, after selecting action i at time t, the
corresponding Q-value is updated according to
Qi(t+ 1) = Qi(t) + α[ri(t)−Qi(t)] (1)
where ri(t) is the observed reward for action i at time t,
and α is the learning rate.
Next, we need to specify how the agent selects actions.
Greedy selection, when the action with the highest Q
value is selected, might generally lead to globally subop-
timal solution. Thus, one needs to incorporate some way
of exploring less–optimal strategies. Here we focus on
Boltzmann action selection mechanism, where the prob-
ability xi of selecting the action i is given by
xi(t) =
eQi(t)/T∑
k e
Qk(t)/T
, i = 1, 2, · · · , n. (2)
where the temperature T > 0 controls explo-
ration/exploitation tradeoff: for T → 0 the agent always
acts greedily and chooses the strategy corresponding to
the maximum Q–value (pure exploitation), whereas for
T →∞ the agent’s strategy is completely random (pure
exploration).
We are interested in the continuous time limit of the
above learning scheme. Toward this end, we divide the
time into intervals δt, replace t + 1 with t + δt and α
with αδt. Next, we assume that within each interval
δt, the agent samples his actions, calculates the average
reward ri for action i, and applies Eq. 1 at the end of
each interval to update the Q-values.2
In the continuous time limit δt → 0, one obtains the
following differential equation describing the evolution of
the Q values:
Q˙i(t) = α[ri(t)−Qi(t)] (3)
Next, we would like to express the dynamics in terms
of strategies rather than the Q values. Toward this end,
we differentiate Eq. 2 with respect to time and use Eq. 3.
After rescaling the time, t → αt/T , we arrive at the
following set of equations:
x˙i
xi
= [ri −
∑n
k=1
xkrk]− T
∑n
k=1
xk ln
xi
xk
. (4)
The first term in Eq. 4 asserts that the probability of
taking action i increases with a rate proportional to the
overall efficiency of that strategy, while the second term
describes the agent’s tendency to randomize over possible
actions. The steady state strategy profile, xsi , if it exists,
can be found from equating the right hand side to zero,
which can be shown to yield
xsi =
eri/T∑
ke
rk/T
. (5)
We would like to emphasize that xsi corresponds to the
so called Gibbs distribution for a statistical–mechanical
system with energy −ri at temperature T . Indeed, it can
be shown that the above replicator dynamics minimizes
the following function resembling free energy:
Φ[x] = −
∑
k
rkxk + T
∑
k
xk lnxk (6)
where we have denoted x = (x1, · · · , xn),
∑n
i=1xi = 1.
Note that the minimizing the first term is equivalent to
maximizing the expected reward, whereas minimizing the
second term means maximizing the entropy of the agent
strategy. The relative importance of those terms is regu-
lated by the choice of the temperature T . We note that
recently a free energy minimization principle has been
suggested as a framework for modeling perception and
learning (see [19] for a review of the approach and its
relation to several other neurobiological theories).
2 In the terminology of reinforcement learning, this corresponds to
an off-policy learning, as opposed to on-policy learning, where
one uses Eq. 2 and Eq. 1 concurrently to sample actions and
update the Q-values of those action, respectively (e.g., see [1]).
A potential issue with the latter scheme is that actions that are
played rarely will be updated rarely, which might be problematics
for the convergence of the algorithm. A possible remedy is to
normalize each update amount by the frequency of corresponding
action [1, 18], which can be shown to lead to the same dynamics
Eq. 3 in the continuous time limit.
3B. Two-agent learning
Let us now assume there are two agents that are learn-
ing concurrently, so that the rewards received by the
agents depend on their joint action. The generalization
to this case is introduced via game-theoretical ideas [20].
More specifically, let A and B be the two payoff matrices:
aij (bij) is the reward of the first (second) agent when he
selects i and the second (first) agent selects j. Further-
more, let y = (y1, · · · , yn),
∑n
i=1yi = 1, be the strategy
of the second agent. The expected rewards of the agents
for selecting action i are as follows:
rxi =
∑n
j=1
aijyj , r
y
i =
∑n
j=1
bijxj (7)
The learning dynamics in two-agent scenario case is ob-
tained from Eq. 4 by replacing ri with r
x
i and r
y
i for the
first and second agents, respectively, which yields
x˙i = xi[(Ay)i − x · Ay + TX
∑
j
xj ln(xj/xi)] (8)
y˙i = yi[(Bx)i − y ·Bx+ TY
∑
j
yj ln(yj/yi)] (9)
where (Ay)i is the i element of the vector Ay, and we as-
sume that the exploration rates TX and TY of the agents
can generally be different. This system (without the ex-
ploration term) is known as bi–matrix replicator equa-
tion [20, 21]. Its relation to multi–agent learning has
been examined in [6, 8, 22–24].
Before proceeding further, we elaborate on the con-
nection between the rest-points of the replicator system
Eqs. 8, 9, and the game-theoretic notion of Nash Equi-
librium (NE), which is a central concept in game theory.
Recall that a joint strategy profile (x∗,y∗) is called NE
if no agent can increase his expected reward by unilater-
ally deviating from the equilibrium. It is known that for
TX = TY = 0, all the NE of a game are also rest-points
of the dynamics [20]. The opposite is not true – not all
the rest points correspond to NE. Furthermore, some NE
might correspond to unstable rest points of the dynamics,
which means that they cannot be achieved by the learn-
ing process. For any finite TX , TY > 0, the rest points
will be generally different from the NE of the game. In
the limit TX , TY → ∞, agents are insensitive to the re-
wards and mix uniformly over the actions. In this work
we study the behavior of the learning dynamics in the
intermediate range of exploration rates.
C. Exploration causes dissipation
It is known that for TX = TY = 0 the system of
Eqs. 8, 9 are conservative [20, 21], so that the total phase
space volume is preserved. It can be shown, however,
that any finite exploration rate TX , TY > 0 makes the
system dissipative or volume contracting [6]. While this
fact might not be crucial in high–dimensional dynamical
system, its implications for low–dimensional system, and
specifically for two–dimensional dynamical system con-
sidered here are crucial. Namely, the finite dissipation
rate means that the system cannot have any limit cycles,
and the only possible asymptotic behavior is a conver-
gence to a rest point. Furthermore, in situation when
there is only one interior rest point, it is guaranteed to
be globally stable.
To demonstrate the dissipative nature of the system
for TX , TY > 0, it is useful to make the following trans-
formation of variables
uk = ln
xk+1
x1
, vk = ln
yk+1
y1
, k = 1, 2, · · · , n− 1. (10)
The replicator system in the modified variables reads [6,
21]
u˙k =
∑
j a˜kje
vj
1 +
∑
je
vj
− TXuk , v˙k =
∑
j b˜kje
uj
1 +
∑
je
uj
− TY vk(11)
where
a˜kj = ak+1,j+1 − a1,j+1 , b˜kj = bk+1,j+1 − a1,j+1 (12)
Let us recall the Liouville formula: If z˙ = F(z) is defined
on the open set U in Rn and if G ⊂ U has volume V (t)
of G(t) = {x(t) : x ∈ G}, then the rate of change of a
volume V, which contain of set of points G in the phase
space is proportional to the divergence of F [5]. Consult-
ing with Eqs. 11, we observe that the dissipation rate is
given by [6]
∑
k
[
∂u˙k
∂uk
+
∂v˙k
∂vk
]
≡ −(TX + TY )(n− 1) < 0 (13)
As we mentioned above, the dissipative nature of the dy-
namics has important implications for two-action games
that we consider next.
D. Two–action games
Let us consider two action games, and let x and y
denote the probability of selecting the first action by the
first and second agents, respectively. Then the learning
dynamics Eqs. 8, 9 attain the following form:
x˙
x(1 − x)
= (ay + b)− ln
x
1− x
, (14)
y˙
y(1− y)
= (cx+ d)− ln
y
1− y
(15)
where we have introduced
a = −
a21 + a12 − a11 − a22
TX
, b =
a12 − a22
TX
(16)
c = −
b21 + b12 − b11 − b22
TY
, d =
b12 − b22
TY
(17)
4The vertices of the simplex {x, y} = {0, 1} are rest
points of the dynamics. For any TX , TY > 0, those rest
points can be shown to be unstable. This means that
any trajectory that starts in the interior of the simplex,
0 < x, y < 1, will asymptotically converge to an interior
rest point. The position of those rest points is found by
nullifying the RHS of Eqs. 14, 15. For the remaining of
this paper, we will examine the interior rest point equa-
tions in details.
III. ANALYSIS OF INTERIOR REST POINTS
A. Symmetric Equlibria
First, we consider the case of symmetric equilibria, x =
y and TX = TY = T , in which case the interior rest point
equation is
ax+ b = ln
x
1− x
(18)
Graphical representation of Eq. 18 is illustrated in Fig. 1
where we plot both sides of the equation as a function of
x. First of all, note that the RHS of Eq. 18 is a monotoni-
cally increasing function, assuming values in (−∞,∞) as
x changes between (0, 1). Thus, it is always guaranteed
to have at least one solution. Further inspection shows
that the number of possible rest points depends on the
type of the game as well as the temperature T .
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
−4
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FIG. 1: The graphical illustration of the rest point equation
for the symmetric case, Eq. 18. The solid curve corresponds
to the RHS, and the three lines correspond to the LHS for
subcritical, critical and supercritical temperature values, re-
spectively.
For instance, there is a single solution whenever a ≤ 0,
for which the LHS is a non–increasing function of x.
Next, we examine the condition for having more than
one rest point, which is possible when a > 0. Consult
with Fig. 1: For sufficiently large temperature, there is
only a single solution. When decreasing T , however, a
second solution appears exactly at the point where the
LHS becomes tangential to the RHS. Thus, in addition
to Eq. 18, at the critical temperature we should have
a =
1
x(1− x)
, (19)
or, alternatively,
x =
1
2
[
1±
√
1−
4
a
]
(20)
Note that the above solution exists only when a ≥ 4.
Plugging 20 into 18, we find
b = ln
a± α
a∓ α
−
1
2
(a± α) , α =
√
a2 − 4a (21)
Thus, for any given a ≥ 4, the rest point equation has
three solutions whenever b−c < b < b
+
c , where
b+c = ln
a− α
a+ α
−
a− α
2
, b−c = ln
a+ α
a− α
−
a+ α
2
(22)
For small values of T when a is sufficiently large (and
positive), the two branches b−c and b
+
c are well sepa-
rated. When one increases T , however, at some critical
value those two branches meet and a cusp bifurcation
occurs [25]. The point where the two bifurcation curves
meet can be shown to be (a, b) = (4,−2), and is called
a cusp point. A saddle-node bifurcation occurs all along
the boundary of the region, except at the cusp point,
where one has a codimension-2 bifurcation - i.e., two pa-
rameters have to be tuned for this type of bifurcation to
take place [25]. This boundary in the parameter space is
shown in Fig. 2.
4 6 8 10
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c
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Bistable
FIG. 2: Demonstration of the cusp bifurcation in the space
of parameters a and b for symmetric equilibria.
B. General Case
We now examine the most general case. We find it
useful to introduce variables u = ln x1−x , v = ln
y
1−y .
5!10 !5 0 5 10
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g(u) : c < 0
g(u) : c > 0
FIG. 3: (Color online) Graphical representation of the general
rest point equation for two different values of c : Intersections
represent rest points.
Then the interior rest point equations can be rewritten
as
u = b+ a
1
1 + e−v
, v = d+ c
1
1 + e−u
(23)
where a, b , c, and d have been already defined in
Eqs. 16, 17. Eliminating v we obtain
1
a
u−
b
a
=
[
1 + e
−d− c
1+e−u
]
−1
≡ g(u) . (24)
The solution of Eq. 24 are the rest point(s) of the dy-
namic. Its graphical representation is shown in Fig. 3.
It is easy to see that 0 < g(u) < 1. Furthermore, we
have from Eq. 24
g′(u) = cg(1− g)
1
4 cosh2 u2
(25)
Thus, g(u) is a monotonically increasing (decreasing)
function whenever c > 0 (c < 0).
Next, we classify the games according to the number
of rest points they allow. Let us consider two cases:
ı) ac < 0: Note that in Eq. 24 the LHS is a monoton-
ically increasing (decreasing) function for a > 0 (a < 0).
As stated above, RHS is also a monotonically increasing
(decreasing) function whenever c > 0 (c < 0). Con-
sequently, whenever a and c have different signs, i.e.
ac < 0, one of the sides is a monotonically increasing
function while the other is a monotonically decreasing;
thus, there can be only one interior rest point, which,
due to the dissipative nature of the dynamics, is globally
stable. An example of this class of game is Matching
Pennies that will be discussed in Section IV.
ıı) ac > 0: In this case it is possible to have one, two
or three interior rest points. For the sake of concreteness,
we focus on a > 0, c > 0, so that both the LHS and RHS
of Eq. 24 are monotonically increasing functions.
Recall, that at the critical point when the second solu-
tion appears, the LHS of Eq. 24 should be tangential to
g(u). Consider now the set of all tangential lines to g(u)
in Eq. 24, and let δmin and δmax be the minimum and
maximum value of the intercepts among those tangential
lines for any u and TY . The intercept of the line given
by the LHS of Eq. 24, on the other hand, equals − ba , and
is independent of the temperature. It is straightforward
to check that multiple rest points are possible only when
δmin < −
b
a < δmax.
A full analysis along those lines (see Appendix A) re-
veals that the number of possible rest points depend on
the ratios ba and
d
c , as depicted in Fig. 4. First, consider
the parameter range 0 < − ba ,−
d
c < 1 (shaded light-grey
region in Fig. 4), which correspond to so called coor-
dination games that have three NE. The learning dy-
namics in these games can have three rest points, that
intuitively correspond to the perturbed NE. In partic-
ular, those rest points will converge to the NE as the
exploration rates vanish. When a, c < 0, the parameter
range 0 < − ba ,−
d
c < 1 corresponds to so called anti-
coordination games. Those games also have three NE, so
the learning dynamics can have three rest points.
Let us now focus on light grey (not-shaded) regions in
Fig. 4. The games in this parameter range have a single
NE. At the same time, the learning dynamics might still
have multiple rest points. Those additional rest-points
exist only for a range of exploration rates, and disappear
when both exploration rates TX , TY are sufficiently low or
sufficiently high; see Appendix B for details. An example
of this type game will be presented in Section IV.
"
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FIG. 4: (Color online) Characterization of different games in
the parameter space with a, c > 0. Dark blue region cor-
responds to games that can have only a single rest point,
whereas the games in the light grey regions can have three
rest-points. The shaded grey square corresponds to games
that have three Nash equilibria.
Note that the Fig. 4 was obtained by assuming that
6TX and TY are independent parameters. Assuming some
type of functional dependence between those two param-
eters alters the above characterization. For instance, con-
sider the case TX = TY = T . At the critical point we
have (in addition to Eq. 24) ag′(u) = 1, which yields
ac =
4 cosh2 u2
g(1− g)
(26)
It can be shown3 that when TX = TY = T the above
conditions can be met only when 0 < − ba < 1, 0 <
− dc < 1 (shaded region in Fig. 4), which correspond to
the domain of multiple NE: coordination (a, c > 0) and
anti–coordination (a, c < 0) games.
It is illustrative to write Eq. 26 in terms of the original
variables x and y:
ac =
1
x(1− x)y(1 − y)
(27)
It can be seen that Eq. 19 is recovered when a = c and
x = y. Furthermore, since 0 < x, y < 1, the above
condition can be satisfied only when ac ≥ 16.
a. Linear Stability Analysis We conclude this sec-
tion by briefly elaborating on the dynamic stability of
the interior rest points. Note that, whenever there is a
single rest point it will be globally stable due to the dis-
sipative nature of the dynamics. Thus, we focus on the
case when there are multiple rest points.
For the interior rest points, the eigenvalues of the Ja-
cobian of the dynamical system Eqs. 14,15 are as follows:
λ1,2 = −1±
√
acy(1− y)x(1 − x) (28)
Let us focus on symmetric games and symmetric equi-
libria (i.e. x = y). From Eq. 28 we find the eigenvalues
λ1,2 = −1 ± ax0(1− x0), so that the stability condition
is ax0(1 − x0) < 1. Recalling that at the critical point
we have a = 1x0(1−x0) , it is straightforward to demon-
strate that for the middle rest–point the above condition
is always violated, meaning that it is always unstable.
Similar reasoning shows that two other rest points are
locally stable, and depending on the starting point of the
learning trajectory, the system will converge to one of the
two points. An example of the flows generated by the dy-
namics for below–critical and above–critical exploration
rates is depicted in Fig. 5(a) and 5(b).
3 Indeed, substituting g(u) from Eq. 24 into Eq. 26 one formally
obtains a quadratic equation for T , AT 2 + BT + C = 0, A =
cosh2(u/2)
a′c′
+ u2, B = (1 + 2 b
′
a′
) u
a′
, C = (1 + b
′
a′
) b
′
a′
where: a′ =
a21 + a12 − a11 − a22 and c′ = b21 + b12 − b11 − b22, b′ = a12 −
a22. Requiring that T is a real positive number yields 4AC < 0,
or 0 < −b/a < 1. With the similar reasoning the domain of d/c
of multiple intersection is 0 < −d/c < 1.
x
y
0 1
1
(a)
x
y
1
0 1
(b)
FIG. 5: (Color online) Illustration of dynamical flow for a
system with three (a) and single (b) rest points. Note that
the middle rest point in (a) is unstable.
IV. EXAMPLES
We now illustrate the above findings on several games
shown in Fig. 6. The row (column) number corresponds
to the actions of the first (second) agent. Each cell con-
tains a reward pair (aij , bji), where aij and bji are the
corresponding elements of the reward matrices A and B.
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FIG. 6: Examples of reward matrices for typical two-action
games.
Our first example is the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD)
where each player should decide whether to Cooperate
7(C) or Defect (D). An example of a PD payoff matrix
is shown in Fig. 6. In PD the defection is a dominant
strategy – it always yields a better reward regardless of
the other player choice. Thus, even though it is beneficial
for the players to cooperate, the only Nash equilibrium of
the game is when both players defect. For TX = TY = 0,
the dynamics always converges to the NE.
In our PD example we have ba =
d
c = −2, so accord-
ing to Fig. 4 there is a single interior rest point for any
TX , TY > 0. Furthermore, due to the dissipative na-
ture of the dynamics, the system is guaranteed to con-
verge to this rest point for any finite exploration rates.
Note that this is in stark contrast from the behavior of
ǫ-greedy learning reported in [10], where the authors ob-
served that, starting from some initial conditions, the
dynamics might never converge, instead alternating be-
tween different strategy regimes. The lack of convergence
and chaotic behavior in their case can be attributed to
the hybrid nature of the dynamics.
Next, we consider Matching Pennies (MP), which is
a zero sum game where the first (second) player wins if
both players select the same (different) actions; see Fig. 6.
This game does not have any pure NE, but it has a mixed
NE at x∗ = y∗ = 12 . This mixed NE is a rest point of
the learning dynamics at TX = TY = 0 which is a center
point surrounded by periodic orbits [21]. For this game
we have ac < 0. Thus, there can be only one interior rest
point, which can be globally stable for any TX , TY > 0.
Furthermore, a particular feature of this game is that
finite TX , TY does not perturb the position of the rest-
point (since the entropic term is zero for x = y = 12 ).
We now consider a coordination game (shaded area
in Fig. 4) where players have an incentive to select the
same action. In the example shown in Fig. 6, the play-
ers should decide whether to hunt a stag (S) or a hare
(H). This game has two pure NE, (S,S) and (H,H), as
well as a mixed NE at (x∗, y∗) = (− ba ,−
d
c ), which, for
the particular coordination game shown in Fig. 6, yields
x∗ = y∗ = 2/5. For sufficiently small exploration rates,
the learning dynamics has three rest points that intu-
itively correspond to the three NE of the game. Further-
more, the rest points corresponding to the pure equilib-
ria are stable, while the one corresponding to the mixed
equilibrium is unstable.
When increasing the exploration rates, there is a crit-
ical line (T cX , T
c
Y ) so that for any TX > T
c
X , TY > T
c
Y
only one of the rest points survives. In Fig. 7 we show
the bifurcation diagram on the plane TX = TY .
4 We find
that most coordination games are characterized by a dis-
continuous pitch-fork bifurcation (see Fig. 7(a)), where
above the critical line the surviving rest point correspond
to the risk-dominant NE 5. There is an exception, how-
4 We find that the bifurcation structure is qualitatively similar for
the more general case TX 6= TY .
5 In a general coordination game, the strategy profile (1,1) is risk
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FIG. 7: (Color online) Bifurcation diagram of the rest points
for TX = TY = T : (a) Disconnected pitchfork, with mixed
NE: (x∗, y∗) = (2/5, 2/5) (b) Continuous pitchfork, with
mixed NE: (x∗, y∗) = (1/3, 2/3).
ever, for games with ba +
d
c = −1. This condition de-
scribes games where none of the pure NE are strictly risk
dominant, and where the mixed NE satisfies x∗+y∗ = 1.
The rest point structure undergoes a continuous pitch-
fork bifurcation as shown Fig. 7(b) whenever a = c and
b
a +
d
c = −1. One can show that when the above condi-
tion is met, the critical point u0 that satisfies g
′(u0) =
1
a
, 1au0 −
b
a = g(u0), is also the inflection point of g(u),
g′′(u0) = 0.
The other class of two-action games with multiple NE
are so-called anti–coordination games where it is mutu-
ally beneficial for the players to select different actions.
In anti–coordination games, one has a, c < 0 whereas
0 < − ba < 1, 0 < −
d
c < 1. A popular example is the so
called Hawk-Dove game where players should choose be-
tween an aggressive (H) or peaceful (D) behavior. This
game has two pure NE, (H,D), (D,H), and a mixed NE
at (x∗, y∗) = (− ba ,−
d
c ). An example is shown in Fig. 6
with a mixed NE at x∗ = y∗ = 1/3.
dominant if (a12 − a22)(b12 − b22) ≥ (a21 − a11)(b21 − b11).
In symmetric coordination games (i.e., as shown in Fig. 4) the
strategy profile is risk-dominant if it yields a better payoff against
an opponent that plays a uniformly mixed strategy.
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FIG. 8: (Color online) Bifurcation in the domain of the games
with a, c > 0, b
a
> 0, − 1
2
> d
c
> −1. In this example we have:
d
c
= −0.8, b
a
= 0.1: a) Rest point structure plotted against
TX for TY < T
c
Y and TY > T
c
Y . b) The rest point struc-
ture plotted against TY for T
c−
X < TX < T
c+
X (TY ). In both
graphs, the red dot-dashed lines correspond to the unstable
rest points.
Anti-coordination games have similar bifurcation
structure compared to the coordination games. Namely,
there is a critical line (T cX , T
c
Y ) so that for any TX >
T cX , TY > T
c
Y only a single rest point survives. As in
the coordination games, the bifurcation is discontinuous
for most parameter values. The condition for continuous
pitch-fork bifurcation in the anti-coordination games is
given by a = c and ba =
d
c . Thus, those games have a
symmetric NE x∗ = y∗. Furthrmore, the critical point
where the second solution appears is also the inflection
point of g(u), g′′(u0) = 0.
Finally, let us consider the games with a single NE,
for which the learning dynamics can still have multiple
rest points. To be specific, we focus on the case a, c > 0,
for which the possible regimes are outlined in Fig. 4. In
Fig. 8(a) , we show the dependence of the rest point struc-
ture on the parameter TX , for two different values of TY ,
for ba = 0.1,
d
c = −0.8. It can be seen that for suffi-
ciently small TX , the learning dynamics allows a single
rest point (that corresponds to the NE of the game).
Similarly, there is single rest points whenever TY is suffi-
ciently hight. However, there is a critical exploration rate
for agent Y , T cY , so that for any 0 < TY < T
c
Y , there is a
range T
c−
X (TY ) < TX < T
c+
X (TY ), for which the dynam-
ics allows three rest points. In contrast to coordination
and anti–coordination games considered above, those ad-
ditional rest points do not correspond to any NE of the
game. In particular, they disappear when TX , TY are suf-
ficiently small. We elaborate more on the appearance of
those rest points in Appendix B.
Fig. 8(b) shows the bifurcation diagram for the same
game but plotted against TY . Note that the two diagrams
are asymmetric. In particular, in contrast to Fig. 8(a),
here multiple solutions are possible even when TY is arbi-
trarily small (provided that T
c−
X (TY ) < TX < T
c+
X (TY )).
This asymmetry is due to the fact that the agents’ pay-
off matrices represent different games. In this particular
case, the first player’s payoff matrix corresponds to a
dominant action game, whereas the second player’s pay-
off matrix corresponds to a coordination game. Clearly,
when TX is very small, the first player will mostly select
the dominant action, so there can be only a single rest
point at small TX . Increasing TX will make the entropic
term more important, until at a certain point, multiple
rest points will emerge.
The same picture is preserved for the parameter range
b
a < −1,−
1
2 <
d
c < 0 (the other light grey horizon-
tal stripe). On the other hand, the players effectively
exchange roles in the parameter ranges corresponding
to the vertical stripes: dc > 0,−1 <
b
a < −
1
2 and
d
c < −1,−
1
2 <
b
a < 0. In this case, there is a critical
exploration rate T cX , so that for any 0 < TX < T
c
X , there
is a range T
c−
Y (TX) < TY < T
c+
Y (TX), for which the dy-
namics allows three rest points.
Finally, we note that the rest point behavior is different
in the light grey regions where the parameters are also
confined to ba > 0,
d
c < −1 and
b
a < −1,
d
c > 0. In those
regions, multiple rest points are available only when both
TX and TY are strictly positive, i.e., T
c−
X > 0, T
c−
Y > 0.
V. DISCUSSION
We have presented a comprehensive analysis of two
agent Q–learning dynamics with Boltzmann action selec-
tion mechanism, where the agents exploration rates are
governed by temperatures TX , TY . For any two action
game at finite exploration rate the dynamics is dissipa-
tive and thus guaranteed to reach a rest point asymptot-
ically. We demonstrated that, depending on the game
and the exploration rates, the rest point structure of
the learning dynamics is different. When TX = TY , for
games with a single NE (either pure or mixed) there is
a single globally stable rest point for any positive explo-
ration rate. Furthermore, we analytically examined the
impact of exploration/noise on the asymptotic behavior,
and showed that in games with multiple NE the rest–
9point structure undergoes a bifurcation so that above
a critical exploration rate only one globally stable solu-
tion persists. Previously, a similar observation for certain
games was observed numerically in Ref. [26], where the
authors studied Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE)
among agents with bounded rationality. In fact, it can
be shown that QRE corresponds to the rest–point of the
Boltzmann Q-learning dynamics. A similar bifurcation
pictures was also demonstrated for certain continuous ac-
tion games [27].
In general, we observed that for TX 6= TY , the learning
dynamics is qualitatively similar for games with multiple
NE. Namely, there is a bifurcation at critical exploration
rates T cX and T
c
Y , so that the learning dynamics allows
three (single) rest points below (above) those critical val-
ues. In particular, the rest points converge to the NE of
the game when TX , TY → 0. What is perhaps more in-
teresting is that for certain games with a single NE, it
is possible to have multiple rest points in the learning
dynamics when TX 6= TY . Those additional rest points
persist only for a finite range of exploration rates, and
disappear when the exploration rates TX and TY tend to
zero.
We suggest that the sensitivity of the learning dynam-
ics on exploration rate can be useful for validating var-
ious hypotheses about possible learning mechanisms in
experiments. Indeed, most empirical studies so far have
been limited to games with a single equilibrium, such as
matching pennies, where the dynamics is rather insensi-
tive to the exploration rate. We believe that for different
games (such as coordination or anti-coordination game),
the fine–grained nature of the rest point structure, and
specifically, its sensitivity to the exploration rate, can
provide much richer information about learning mecha-
nisms employed by the agents.
Note Added: After completing the manuscript, we be-
came aware of a very recent work reporting similar re-
sults [28], which studies convergence properties and bi-
furcation in the solution structure using local stability
analysis. For games with a single rest point such a Pris-
oner’s Dilemma, local stability is subsumed by the global
stability demonstrated here. The bifurcation results are
similar, even though [28] studies only coordination games
and does not differentiate between continuous and dis-
continuous pitchfork bifurcation. Finally, the analytical
form of the phase diagram Eq. 22 for the symmetric case,
as well as the possibility of multiple rest points for games
with a single NE demonstrated here, are complementary
to the results presented in [28].
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Appendix A: Classification of games according to
the number of allowable rest-points
Here we derive the conditions for multiple rest-points.
We assume a, c > 0 for the sake of concreteness.
Consider the set of all the tangential lines to g(u) (see
Eq. 24), and let δTY (u) be the intercept of the tangential
line that passes through point u, δTY (u) = g(u)− g
′(u)u:
Here the subscript indicates that the intercept depends
on the exploration rate TY via coefficients c and d. The
extremum of function δTY (u) happens at
dδTY
du = −g
′′u =
0 where:
g′′(u) = −
cg(1− g)
16 cosh4 u2
(
c tanh
[
d
2
+
c/2
1 + e−u
]
+ 2 sinhu
)
(A1)
Let u0 be the point where g
′′(u0) = 0. A simple analysis
yields that u0 > 0 whenever d < −c/2, and u0 < 0
otherwise. Next, let δmin = minu,TY δTY (u) and δmax =
maxu,TY δTY (u), where minimization and maximization
is over both u and TY . It can be shown that there can
be multiple solutions only when δmin < −
b
a < δmax.
We now consider different possibilities depending on
the ratio dc . Due to symmetry, it is sufficient to consider
d
c < −
1
2 . We differentiate the following cases:
ı) − 1 < dc < −
1
2 : In this case one has δmin = −∞,
δmax = 1. Thus, there will be one rest point whenever
b
a < −1.
ıı)dc < −1: In this case one has δmax =
1
2 , thus, there
will be single rest point whenever ba < −
1
2 . Furthermore,
although an analytical expression for δmin is not avail-
able, the corresponding boundary can be found by nu-
merically solving a transcendental equation − ba = δmin
for different dc .
Repeating the same reasoning for dc > −
1
2 yields the
different regions depicted in Fig. 4.
Appendix B: Appearance of multiple rest points in
games with single NE
We now elaborate on games with single NE for which
the learning dynamics still can have multiple rest points.
For the sake of concreteness, let us consider one of the
regions in Fig. 4 that corresponds to ba > 0, −1 <
d
c < −1/2. The graphical representation of the rest
point equation is shown in Fig. 9. For a given TY , the
two lines correspond to the critical values of T
c−
X (Ty)
and T
c+
X (TY ). Let us consider the case TY = 0. It is
easy to see that in this limit g(u) becomes a step func-
tion, g(u) = θ(u − u˜), where u˜ is found by requiring
d
c +
1
1+e−u = 0, which yields u˜ = ln
−d
d+c . Simple calcu-
lations yield T
c−
X (TY = 0) =
a˜
u˜
b
a and T
c−
X (TY = 0) =
a˜
u˜ (
b
a + 1), where a˜ = a21 + a12 − a11 − a22 ≡ aTX . For
10
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FIG. 9: Graphical illustration of the multi-rest point equation
for a game with a single NE. Here a, c > 0, b
a
= 1
2
, d
c
= − 3
4
.
general TY > 0, the corresponding values T
c−
X (TY ) and
T
c+
X (TY ) can be found numerically. Finally, note that
when increasing TY , there is a critical exploration rate
TY = T
c
Y so that for TY > T
c
Y the multiple solutions will
disappear. It is easy to see that T cY corresponds to the
point when the maximum value of the intercept to g(u)
for a given TY equals −
b
a .
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